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There remains, in a word, but one war which is truly inevitable, according to the thought of certain persons. I mean an Anglo-German war. Let us consider, in the light of public opinion, what this unfortunate conviction is worth. The matter touches us Frenchmen very closely; for the question is asked whether we could remain merely spectators of the conflict, and whether England, if she engaged in it, would not necessarily draw France after her. According to this hypothesis, the *entente cordiale*, which we had supposed to be the commencement of a world *entente*, would have become only a military alliance, more or less disguised under the derision of pacific promises. Let us appeal to public opinion, for it is this which will solve the problem, provided it is not allowed to be taken unawares.

In reality, neither Germany nor England wishes war, and clearly nothing is more sincere than the declarations of the sovereigns of the governments and of the parliaments exchanged between the two countries in favor of peace. Germany would only compromise her future by war. That is perfectly clear. As for England, pessimism reasons otherwise, or fails to reason. It is certain that she is suffering profoundly from universal competition, and principally from the competition of Germany. Her maritime commerce is threatened in all parts of the world. She has not, like France, the resource of special and privileged productions to oppose to her rivals. German goods are being substituted in all the markets of the globe for English goods, as are American, Japanese, Swiss goods, etc. The English workman is down, is complaining. In the English colonies, at Shanghai as well as at London, the representative of English industry is displaced by the German representative, an intelligent, indefatigable pusher. So it is the future of the youth of the English nation which is growing darker. It is the era of an unexampled prosperity which is disappearing before an era of difficulties, and that too in a country full of the enjoyments of life; in a country where the need of prosperity has become national, hereditary, thanks to centuries of conquest and of success; in a country which, far from stopping in the pathway of its successes, aspires, on the contrary, to widen them by the extension of a new policy, that of imperialism, over the whole world. *Noblesse oblige*. How can one arrest the rush of life, — how stop it? It is English activity, English policy, English ambition suddenly checked when in full advance; and the difficulty will go on increasing. The population of Germany augments its vitality by means of its fleets. Will England, after having lost her economic superiority, allow herself to lose her naval superiority? Would it not be better to take advantage of her actual superiority and of her friendship with France to have done once for all with the German peril?

Such is the reasoning, not of the government certainly, but of the man in the street who directs those who govern. This reasoning I have heard developed since imperialism became a government doctrine. I heard it opposed to France in 1893, and just the same in 1898, and the man in the street naively believes that the German peril can be put an end to by means of a war. He believes it all the more the less he knows what war is. He has not suffered by war. Within the memory of man he has not known invasion. He does not pay, or scarcely pays, an income tax. And, finally, he is not

compelled to render military service. He has known no other wars, except remote expeditions made, to his profit, by hired troops. He is one of the only people in the world who live in this happy ignorance. There lies the danger. He has heard only of the German peril for years, and as he is brave, simple, a genuine bull, John Bull is ready to fall upon the only scarecrow which is shaken before him.

Nevertheless, it ought to be demonstrated to him that war, even a victorious one, far from being a remedy, would be the most detestable of operations, an aggravation, in a word. Let us suppose the German fleets and armies crushed. There would, nevertheless, remain in Germany sixty millions of German workingmen, all the more active the more they had suffered. And what would that mean? The remedy is understood by no one better than by the Englishman, who is virile, courageous and begins his life again without any complaint. The remedy is a new education in the presence of competition and no longer in the presence of assured success. The remedy is energy in labor and not a *coup d'état* of despair.

England is not a pessimist. She asks only to be allowed to direct her course in the way of her interests and the general interests of civilization. She will avoid war, as she desires to avoid ruin; and the rôle of France, her friend, will be to help her to find, as we have found ourselves, her "Damascus Road," for her own very great advantage and that of other peoples whom no government could stampede into an inevitable war, if France and England should unite with all the civilized states to safeguard peace.

### The Cost of Armed Peace.

*Address of Hon. J. A. Tawney at the National Peace Congress, Chicago, May 5, 1909.*

The modern national state is a vastly different political organization from the ancient and mediæval empire. Part of this difference is of great significance in the discussion of international peace. As late as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the modern state arose from the ruins of the old Roman Empire, it was commonly believed by the world's political leaders that there could be but one great nation at a given time, and that any nation to become great must conquer the wealth and enslave the people of other nations. From this conception of the relations of nations to each other it followed that no nation could hope to remain long dominant in world politics, and that every full bloom of national splendor and power must be followed by a period of decline and decay. Coalitions of foreign foes, want of patriotism, and the loss of individual manhood, which luxury and over-civilization always bring to a people supported by slaves, were ever present to threaten and destroy the dominant nation.

Even the Bourbon kings of France, as late as the reign of Louis the XIV., believed themselves to be, each in his time, the viceroys of God on earth. Not only did they believe themselves to be rulers by divine right, but they likewise believed it to be their duty as the viceroys of God to surpass all other kings in the splendor of their courts, to intimidate and subjugate abroad and at home, to imitate the glory of God in the splendor of their palaces, in the sumptuousness of their tables, and in the

costliness of their costumes and retinues. To this end they carried on perpetual warfare with other kings, and to this end they taxed their own people until revolution became a necessity and the only means of escape from the war burdens that were crushing the people to earth.

In the world march of civilization all this has changed, until to-day we hold that the greatness of a nation rests not upon conquered wealth and the bent backs of slaves, but upon its natural resources and upon the industry, the intelligence, and the patriotism of the individual citizen. To-day we realize that there must be as many nations coexistent on the earth as geographical, racial and historical conditions make necessary. We regard wars carried on merely for territorial acquisition or national aggrandizement as national robberies. The character of a nation is judged to-day by the same standards as the character of the individual man.

It is clear to all intelligent people at the opening of the twentieth century that there is no law growing out of the necessary relations of nations to each other which makes it inevitable that every great nation must, sooner or later, decline and ultimately fall. There is no inherent reason why nations should not exist and grow great side by side as long as geographical and climatic conditions remain approximately unchanged. Indeed, there are abundant reasons to-day why no nation can attain to the full measure of its greatness except through relations of mutual helpfulness with every other nation.

We have entered upon an era of national specialization, where all nations are more or less interdependent, where each nation relies upon other nations for some of the necessities of its life, where no nation lives to itself alone, and where none can perish without loss to the world. International commerce, international trade, international language, art and literature, international political influence and example all demand that permanent peace be maintained among all nations.

The question for the world to determine is, Shall this be an armed peace, or will the nations of the world recognize the authority and acquiesce in the decisions of a world-wide federation, thereby insuring international peace without the cost incident to the preparation for war? Such a federation or international state would be but a slight step forward in comparison with the substitution of the authority of the national states in the settlement of conflicts between warring clans and tribes, or with the substitution of publicly administered justice for the régime of private warfare and individual retaliation.

But because of the inherent selfishness and mutual distrust of nations, it is said by the advocates of an armed peace that the creation of an international state through the federation of the civilized nations of the world is impossible, and that this splendid achievement can be attained only through the instrumentality of powerful armies and navies which will make reasonably certain the defeat of any nation that might initiate and carry on war against another nation. If this be so, then international peace means an armed peace, and that kind of peace cannot endure between nations relatively longer than between individuals. It will inevitably hasten the event for which the nations are now preparing.

The possession of irresponsible power is always a direct temptation to its irresponsible use. Individual citizens are not allowed in times of peace to go armed among

their fellow-citizens because of the temptation to use arms for slight cause in such moments of excitement as every man is liable to in the course of daily experience. Just so there is a danger that nations, upon slight provocation, will declare war when each knows itself to be dangerously armed and fully prepared for war. Great armaments, therefore, instead of being a guaranty of peace, are a continued menace to peace.

Whether or not the advocates of an armed peace are sincere in contending that peace can be insured only by the aid of great armaments permanently maintained, in the light of all the facts, I believe it to be indisputably true that they are more concerned over the question of whether or not their respective nations can successfully compete in the international race now on between the principal nations of the world for supremacy in the size of battleships and in the number of the largest sized battleships the world has ever seen than they are concerned over the question of how best to insure permanent international peace. This mad international race for supremacy in war preparation is all the more astounding because it is taking place at a time when there is no cloud on the international horizon to threaten the existing peaceful relations between all the nations of the world, unless it is occasioned by the senseless rivalry among the nations to excel in martial preparation. To my mind this extensive preparation constitutes a most serious menace to the peace of the world, for it tends naturally in the direction of war even though its alleged purpose is the prevention of war.

I am not alone in contending that national ambition, not the fear of war or the desire for peace, is the prime motive prompting the principal nations of the world to the expenditure of larger sums for war purposes, including battleships, than the world has ever before witnessed. Mr. Asquith, the Premier of England, when discussing the English naval budget a year ago, pronounced a solemn condemnation of the English policy of constructing battleships of the Dreadnaught type, a policy initiated three years before, when the keel of the first great Dreadnaught was laid. He said:

"We do not wish to take a lead, but we want to do everything in our power to prevent a new spurt in competitive shipbuilding between the great naval powers." "Competitive shipbuilding," not competitive peace building, is the prime cause for the enormous war-tax burdens placed upon the people.

The annual expenditures of the United States, England, Germany and France, on account of preparation for war, or, as it is said, that war may be prevented, are to-day greater than the annual expenditures of any one of these nations during any foreign war in which it has ever engaged. In fact, these expenditures have become so great as to excite alarm in each of these principal nations of the world, causing enormous deficits in their current revenues, and necessitating new sources of taxation to meet the demands of a national ambition to excel in the construction of great armaments.

The total expenditures of the United States, England, Germany and France, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, on account of their armies and navies, approximated, in round numbers, a billion, or ten hundred million, dollars. Add to this the sums expended for the same purpose by other nations of the world and you will

have a grand total cost of armed peace so large that the human mind can scarcely comprehend it.

While this cost is so enormous as to be almost beyond the comprehension of man, yet an approximate idea of such cost may be gathered from the annual expenditures which we as a nation are making for this purpose and the rapidity with which these expenditures have increased in recent years. Our total expenditures for the army, navy and fortifications in the fiscal year 1908 aggregated \$204,122,855.57, or 36.5 per cent. of our total revenue, exclusive of postal receipts, which are not included for the purpose of comparison, as the postal revenues and expenditures are a balanced account. Our expenditures during the same year on account of wars past, including all objects for which appropriations are made on that account, were \$180,678,204, or 31 per cent. of our total revenues.

According to the daily statement of the Treasury Department at Washington on April 30, 1909, we have thus far during this fiscal year collected from all sources, except postal receipts, \$493,027,989.69. Up to that date we had expended on account of the army \$110,107,924.96; on account of the navy, \$96,376,012.41, a total of \$206,483,937.37. Therefore, we have expended this fiscal year on account of preparation for war forty-one per cent. of all our revenues, and on account of wars past thirty-one per cent. of all our revenues, or a total expenditure of seventy-two per cent. of all the revenues thus far collected during the current fiscal year on account of wars it is said we are preparing to avoid and wars which we have had in the past.

But this startling statement does not indicate that we have yet reached the maximum cost of armed peace. The expenditures for this purpose the coming fiscal year will be greater than they are this year. They have been increasing rapidly and enormously year by year, not only with us, but with all the principal nations of the world. None of the advocates of armed peace are willing to suggest a limit beyond which this increase shall not go.

The average annual appropriations for our army have leaped from less than \$24,000,000 for each of the eight years immediately preceding the Spanish war to more than \$83,000,000 for each of the eight years ending with the appropriations made at the last session of Congress for the fiscal year 1910. During the same period the average annual appropriations for our navy have increased from a little more than \$27,500,000 to more than \$102,400,000. In other words, the increase in appropriations for the army for the periods named exceeded \$472,000,000, a sum sufficient to cover the whole cost of constructing the Panama Canal, with nearly \$150,000,000 to spare. The increase in the sums appropriated for the navy for these same periods is approximately \$600,000,000, a sum largely in excess of the total appropriations for the support of our entire government for any fiscal year prior to that of 1898.

The combined increase in the appropriations for the army and the navy for the eight-year periods named amounts to \$1,072,000,000, a sum exceeding by more than \$158,000,000 the total interest-bearing debt of the United States. So great has been the increase in this cost of armed peace these last eight years over the eight years ending scarcely ten years ago, that the sum total of the increase is even larger than the stupendous sum

appropriated for all governmental purposes for the fiscal year 1910.

The fact that we are expending, during this fiscal year, seventy-two per cent. of our aggregate revenue in preparing for war and on account of past wars, leaving only twenty-eight per cent. of our revenue available to meet all other governmental expenditures, including internal improvements, the erection of public buildings, the improvement of rivers and harbors, and the conservation of our natural resources, is to my mind appalling. It should arrest the attention of the American people, and not only cause them to demand a decrease in these unnecessary war expenditures, but also prompt them to aid in every way possible in the creation of a public sentiment that would favor the organization of an international federation whose decisions and action in the peaceful settlement of controversies between nations would be recognized and accepted as the final determination thereof. If this were done, it would not necessarily mean the entire abandonment of armies and navies, but it would so far remove the possibility of international wars as to make unnecessary the expenditure of the stupendous sums which are now being collected from the people in the form of taxes and expended for the purpose of maintaining armed peace.

The money expended for this purpose is not the only measure of the cost of armed peace. Think for a moment of what the American people have lost during the past eight years in consequence of the increased expenditure of more than a billion dollars during that time for the purpose of preparing for war in order that war may be prevented.

The most enthusiastic advocates of river and harbor improvements do not estimate that the cost of these improvements would exceed \$500,000,000, only half the amount which we have collected in taxes from the people and expended in war preparation during the last eight years in excess of the amount expended for the same purpose during the eight years preceding 1898. The other half of this enormous increase might well have been expended in other directions which would have contributed to the permanent advancement of the vast and varied interests of ninety millions of people.

In conclusion, permit me to say that, while I thoroughly believe in the wisdom and practicability of an international federated state for the exercise of delegated power in the authoritative determination of international disputes, I am not one of those peace enthusiasts who think the time is near at hand when the world will witness the disarmament of nations. But I do maintain that the time is now here when the people of the principal naval powers of the world, and especially the people of the United States, must come to the support of those who are contending against the advocates of armed peace and who are striving to check the extravagant and wasteful expenditure of public money in competitive construction of needless and useless armaments. If they do not, the burdens of unnecessary taxation will continue to increase until they ultimately impoverish the people and exhaust the resources of their nations.